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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880425 
v. ; 
LIVIO ALPHONSO RAMIREZ : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Cods Ann. 
§ 76-6-302 (1982). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (1982) (Supp. 
1989) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987) (Supp. 1989), 
because the conviction is for a first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Officer Stuck's initial stop of defendant 
was proper as either a voluntary police/citizen encounter or an 
investigatory stop supported by reasonable suspicion. 
2. Whether the showup identification of defendant by 
Gerald Wilson was inherently unreliable or the product of any 
improper suggestion. 
3. Whether the prosecutor's comments during opening 
statement and closing argument prejudiced defendant's right to a 
fair trial. 
4. Whether there was sufficient evidence presented at 
trial to support the jury verdict. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the 
following provisions: 
1. United States Constitution, Amendment IV, 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1982), 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1982), 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982), 
5. Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-30 (1982), 
6. Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 14, 1987, defendant was charged with 
Aggravated Robbery (Record [hereinafter R.] at 7-8). Pretrial 
motions were filed by defendant, moving to suppress a showup 
identification, claiming the procedures used by the police 
officers were unduly suggestive (R. at 49-50). Defendant also 
moved that all evidence obtained by the police officers, 
including the showup identification, be suppressed, claiming the 
evidence was obtained in violation of defendant's right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures (R. at 47-48). Extensive 
testimony on these issues was introduced at three separate 
hearings held March 12, 1988; March 18, 1988; and May 31, 1988 
(Records 211, 213, and 215). The trial court denied both motions 
(R. at 85, 87-88) . 
A jury trial was held on July 11-13, 1988, in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, presiding (R. 212 at 10 and 
213). At trial, defendant was convicted of Aggravated Robbery, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code. Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1982) (R. 212 at 284). Defendant was sentenced to a term of 
five years to life at the Utah State Penitentiary, but was 
granted a stay of the prison sentence and placed on probation for 
three years (R. at 177-78). 
Following trial, defendant moved for a mistrial and new 
trial respectively, claiming remarks by the prosecutor during 
opening statement and closing argument were improper (R. at 163-
64). Following a hearing on this issue and a renewed motion on 
the previous issues, the trial court denied defendant's motion 
(R. 172-173). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Citations for this Statement of Facts are to the trial 
transcript (R. 212) and to the transcripts of the hearings on the 
pretrial motions (R. 213, 211, and 215). 
On August 13, 1987, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Kathy 
Davis, manager of Pizza Hut located at 782 North Redwood Road, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, was leaving the restaurant accompanied by 
her husband, John Davis and her brother Gerald Wilson (R. 212 at 
26-27). The parking lot directly adjacent to the Pizza Hut 
restaurant was very well lighted by four large perimeter lights, 
the Pizza Hut sign, and globe lights that surround the entire 
circumference of the building (R. 212 at 31, 84). As the trio 
were preparing to enter their car, a man suddenly came running 
directly at them, brandishing a metal pipe (R. 212 at 30-31, 62, 
84). As the man (hereinafter pipe robber) approached, he 
accosted Kathy Davis, demanding that she give him the bank bag 
containing the receipts from the restaurant (R. 212 at 29-30). 
Mrs. Davis informed the pipe robber that she did not have the 
bank bag. The pipe robber, visibly upset, insisted that she give 
him the money, and violently pushed her into the car (R. 212 at 
32). As she stood up and attempted to move away from the car, 
she informed him that the bank bag was in the restaurant. The 
pipe robber then angrily pushed her into the car once again, 
yelling, "I want it." (R. 212 at 32). 
Meanwhile, Mr. Wilson attempted to restrain the pipe 
robber, who consequently struck Mr. Wilson in the stomach with 
the butt end of the metal pipe (R. 212 at 84-85, 103). The pipe 
robber then ordered Mr. and Mrs. Davis to enter the restaurant, 
retrieve the money bag, and return (R. 212 at 33-34, 69, 88). 
Nervously, Mrs. Davis entered the restaurant (followed by Mr. 
Davis), obtained the money bag containing $369, and returned (R. 
212 at 33-36 and 65). 
In the interim, Mr. Wilson again attempted to restrain 
the pipe robber. The pipe robber swung the metal pipe, missed 
Mr. Wilson, and hit a rain gutter (R. 212 at 87, 104). Mr. 
Wilson's attention was at that time drawn to a second man 
standing a short distance away holding a gun (hereinafter gun 
robber), after the pipe robber instructed "if they move/shoot 
them." (R. 212 at 63, 85-86). Of the three victims, Mr. Wilson 
was the only witness able to view the gun robber sufficiently to 
later identify him as defendant, Livio Alphonso Ramirez (R. 212 
at 56, 64, 91) . 
Mr. Wilson testified that defendant was standing 
approximately ten feet away and ten feet off the corner of the 
building, 
crouched down and aiming a gun right at my 
head. . . . I was looking at the man with 
the gun -- staring at him. . . . Just 
getting a good description when the time came 
to give it to them, and just about at his 
eyes, I just stared at him. . . .[for a]bout 
a minute or so. 
(R. 212 at 88-89). Mr. Wilson watched defendant with an 
unobstructed view until Mrs. Davis returned with the bank bag, at 
which time both defendant and the pipe robber fled the scene (R. 
212 at 92) . 
The police were summoned to investigate the robbery. 
Officer Vida Travis of the Salt Lake City Police Department took 
statements from the witnesses. Officer Travis testified that, 
at the scene, Mr. Davis described the pipe robber to Officer 
Travis as a male Mexican, eighteen to nineteen years old, six-
foot, slender build, short dark hair and brown eyes, wearing a 
white bandana and a red and white baseball cap (R. 212 at 194, 
Officer Travis testified at an earlier suppression hearing 
that, in refreshing her memory as to what descriptions were given 
by the witnesses, she did not use her personal notes, but relied 
upon a typed report which may not have included the entire 
descriptions given by the witnesses. Officer Travis indicated, 
"apparently they've not included everything in it" (R. 215 at 5). 
195, R. 215 at 4-5). Also at the scene, Mr. Davis had described 
defendant (gun robber) as eighteen to nineteen years old, five-
foot-six, slender build, brown eyes, wearing Levis, a white 
bandana over his face, and a red and white cap, and holding a gun 
(R. 212 at 195, R. 215 at 4-6). Officer Travis testified that 
Mr. Wilson had described the pipe robber as a male Mexican, 
twenty-one to twenty-two years old, five-foot-seven to five-foot-
eight, one hundred fifty-five to one hundred sixty pounds, having 
shaggy brown hair, brown eyes, with a front tooth missing and a 
bald spot on the side of his head, "like a mohawk". Mr. Wilson 
further had indicated that the pipe robber was wearing a blue 
sweater, Levis and a white scarf over part of his face (R. 212 at 
195, R. 215 at 6-7). Mr. Wilson had described defendant (gun 
robber) as a male Mexican, five-foot-nine to six-foot, long 
"shaggy hair", wearing a blue cut-off sweatshirt, Levis, and a 
white scarf across his face, carrying a gun (R. 212 at 196, R. 
213 at 46, R. 215 at 7). 
At trial, both Mr. and Mrs. Davis testified that they 
didn't see the gun robber well enough to identify him (R. 212 at 
34-35, 40, and 63-64). Mr. Wilson testified at trial that he 
studied the gun robber carefully in order to give a description 
to the police and he described the gun robber for the jury (R. 
212 at 88-91). Mr. Wilson also testified at trial that defendant 
had a tatoo on one arm (R. 212 at 88). 
At trial, defendant was shown to be five-foot-ten, one 
hundred and sixty-five pound, Apache Indian with Spanish 
heritage, with three tattoos on one arm including a rose, an ML" 
and a little drummer boy, all of which are visible while wearing 
a cut-off sweatshirt (R. 212 at 250-251). Defendant testified 
that when he was arrested he was wearing a sweatshirt, Levis, and 
a baseball cap, which he identified as State's Exhibits P-9, P-
12, and P-ll respectively (R. 212 at 231). Also during trial, 
the witnesses identified these same three exhibits as being 
similar to or the same as those worn by one of the robbers during 
the robbery (R. 212 at 37, 66, 94-95). 
After officers took the statements from the witnesses, 
a description of the suspects was called into police headquarters 
and a dispatch was issued for two male Mexican suspects, at least 
one tall and skinny, with no part in the hair, wearing a blue 
sweatshirt, Levis, wearing a red and white hat, and white 
handkerchief (R. 212 at 201). 
Shortly after 1:00 a.m., Salt Lake City Police Officer 
Merrill Stuck was cruising in his police car with the headlights 
and radio off in an area approximately two to three blocks south 
of the Pizza Hut, searching for a runaway juvenile (R. 212 at 
151-152, R. 213 at 9). As he drove north up Morton Drive, he 
observed two individuals walking southbound down the sidewalk, 
side by side, toward him. Officer Stuck continued to watch the 
individuals proceed together for approximately half a block (R. 
212 at 153, R. 213 at 7). Suddenly, at a point where Officer 
Stuck believed the individuals recognized his police cruiser, one 
of the men took off running. Officer Stuck could not describe 
this person other than he believed it was a male wearing a light 
colored shirt (R. 212 at 178-179). Officer Stuck immediately 
turned his radio on and advised the dispatcher that an individual 
had just run away upon sighting him, and he had "a pedestrian at 
600 North and Morton Drive" (R. 213 at 14). Officer Stuck then 
drove to where the remaining individual was standing, exited his 
patrol car and asked the individual if he had identification, and 
an explanation as to why the other person ran (R. 212 at 156). 
Officer Stuck testified at the suppression hearing that the 
reason he asked for identification was "the fact that he had been 
with another man who ran from me, and at 1:00 o'clock in the 
morning in an area that had a very high incidence of nighttime 
residential burglary and car prowls"; additionally, he had "taken 
several car prowl reports" during that week from nearby apartment 
buildings (R. 213 at 8-9). 
The individual approached by Officer Stuck had no 
identification, but identified himself has Livio Alphonso 
Ramirez, the defendant in this case (R. 213 at 21). Defendant 
voluntarily cooperated with Officer Stuck, giving not only his 
name, but his date of birth and his address (R. 213 at 21). 
Defendant claimed that he was neither walking with nor did he 
know the man who ran. Defendant indicated the man who ran was 
stocky, wearing black "baggy pants", no shirt, with short black 
hair (R. 212 at 245, R. 215 at 21). Defendant further claimed 
that he had just been to his "uncle" Joe Montoya or Martinez's 
house, and that at the time he was stopped he was walking to warm 
himself up to jog due to an asthmatic condition (R. 212 at 72, 
159, 189, R. 213 at 11, 25, 35-36). 
Officer Stuck testified that prior to the arrival of 
Officer Rackley he neither gave orders to, nor came into physical 
contact with, defendant. Further, he did not attempt to move or 
handcuff defendant or at any time draw his weapon (R. 213 at 21-
2 
22) . 
Shortly after Officer Stuck had obtained the identity 
of defendant, Officer Robert Rackley arrived at the scene. 
Officer Stuck was surprised to see Officer Rackley because 
Rackley was outside his regular patrol sector. (R. 212 at 157). 
Officer Rackley had received both the dispatch indicating that 
the Redwood Road Pizza Hut had been robbed by two males, and also 
the call from Officer Stuck that he had observed two individuals 
in the area of the robbery, one of which ran upon sighting his 
patrol car, and a second who had remained and was about to be 
questioned for identification (R. 211 at 6-7, R. 212 at 200-201). 
The specific description broadcast by dispatch was of two Mexican 
males, one carrying a gun, the other carrying a pipe, last 
observed fleeing northbound through the Pizza Hut parking lot 
toward Redwood Road (R. 212 at 201). The man with the gun was 
described as wearing a blue sweatshirt and Levis, with a dark 
complexion, dark hair, and slender build (R. 211 at 15). 
Officer Rackley, upon viewing defendant, immediately 
indicated that "that guy matches the description of the robbery 
suspect that just went down, we better check him for weapons." 
(R. 211 at 7). Officer Rackley testified that he believed 
2 
Although Officer Stuck could not remember asking defendant to 
raise his hands when he first approached him, he indicated at a 
pretrial hearing that such was possible (R. 213 at 12-13). 
defendant's description matched that dispatch broadcast because 
defendant "was wearing a cut-off sweatshirt with — a sweatshirt 
without sleeves on it and he was wearing Levis and he was a male 
Mexican and he was in the right area. The place where we stopped 
him was about maybe two or three blocks away maximum from the 
scene of the robbery (R. 211 at 8)." 
Officers Stuck and Rackley then proceeded to search 
defendant for weapons and waited for more information to be 
dispatched over the radio (R. 211 at 8). Sometime thereafter, 
defendant was handcuffed to a fence for extra security while 
Officer Stuck proceeded to search the area for the other suspect 
(R. 212 at 184-185, 227). Mr. and Mrs. Davis and Mr. Wilson were 
then escorted (although it is somewhat unclear in what order they 
arrived) to where defendant had been stopped in order to 
determine if they could identify him as one of the robbers (R. 
212 at 40, 69, R. 213 at 49-50, 59, 61-62, 69). While Mr. and 
Mrs. Davis both indicated that they could not make positive 
identification (they both testified that they had not had the 
opportunity to sufficiently view the gun robber at the time of 
the robbery), Mr. Wilson testified he was able to positively 
identify defendant as one of the robbers (R. 212 at 40, 69, 91, 
94, R. 213 at 51). All three witnesses indicated that the extent 
of information the police had proffered to them prior to the 
identification, was that the police had located a suspect who fit 
the description which they had given (R. 212 at 39, 74, 94, R. 
213 at 50, 59, 68-69). Mr. Wilson further testified that when he 
identified the defendant he did not know defendant was handcuffed 
to the fence (R. 212 at 94). 
After allowing the witnesses the opportunity to 
identify defendant, Officers Stuck and Rackley placed defendant 
in the patrol car and proceeded to where he claimed his "uncle" 
Montoya or Martinez lived, in order to determine whether the 
statement he had given was correct (R. 212 at 171-174, R. 213 at 
34-39). The officers discovered that the residence actually 
belonged to a man named Ortega who was not defendant's uncle but 
actually an uncle to defendant's cousin (R. 212 at 186, 219, R. 
213 at 36-37). Upon returning to the patrol car, Officer Stuck 
informed defendant that his story had not panned out (R. 212 at 
171, 234). Defendant claimed that his "uncle" was lying (R. 212 
at 172, R. 213 at 36). Approximately 15 minutes later, defendant 
conceded that he had not been to see his "uncle" but had been out 
walking. Defendant said that he had made the previous false 
statement because he believed the officers would not accept the 
fact that he had been merely out walking (R. 212 at 172-173, R. 
213 at 36). 
Defendant's testimony differed considerably from that 
of the officer. Defendant claimed that he had neither changed 
stories nor had he made any false statements (R. 212 at 236-237). 
Defendant denied that he had indicated the name of his "uncle" 
was Montoya or Martinez, insisting that the only name he had 
given to police was Ortega (R. 212 at 248). Defendant further 
alleged that Officer Stuck was "pissed off" and physically 
threatened him on a number of occasions (R. 212 at 232, 234, 
249). Defendant also indicated that he requested to see his 
"uncle" when the officers attempted to corroborate his story, but 
his request was denied (R. 212 at 234). Finally, defendant 
claimed that he had walked through the Pizza Hut parking lot just 
prior to being stopped by Officer Stuck, but saw or heard nothing 
unusual, except for possibly a fight (R. 212 at 242). 
During a search following the robbery, Officers 
recovered the metal pipe, a red and white cap and handkerchief. 
The cap and handkerchief were behind a Thrifty Drug Store near 
the Pizza Hut (R. 212 at 33-37. The pipe was in "a little 
planter box with shrubberies" in the parking lot (R. 212 at 137). 
Subsequently, the money bag was located and recovered behind a 
neighborhood home, only a short distance from where the robbery 
occurred and where defendant was stopped (R. 212 at 140, 150). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Officer Stuck's initial stop of defendant was valid as 
either a voluntary police/citizen encounter or as an 
investigatory stop supported by reasonable articulable suspicion. 
The prosecutor's comments during opening statement and 
closing argument were proper, or at most constituted harmless 
error, whereby defendant was neither prejudiced or denied a fair 
trial. 
Mr. Wilson's identification of defendant was the result 
of a clear and conscientious observation at the time of the 
robbery, and was not the product of any undue influence or 
unnecessary suggestion. 
The evidence presented at trial, coupled with the 
reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the jury's verdict that 
defendant committed Aggravated Robbery. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL STOP OF DEFENDANT WAS VALID AS 
EITHER A VOLUNTARY POLICE/CITIZEN ENCOUNTER 
OR AN INVESTIGATORY STOP SUPPORTED BY 
REASONABLE SUSPICION, 
Defendant contends that Officer Stuck's initial stop 
was made without sufficient reasonable suspicion, therefore 
constituting an invalid seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
An issue concerning the existence of reasonable 
suspicion and/or probable cause necessarily requires a clear and 
concise statement of facts with the precise order in which they 
occurred. In addition, where the evidence is in dispute, the 
credibility of the witnesses is of the utmost importance. In the 
present case, defendant's motion to suppress was raised several 
different times before, during and after trial. Prior to trial, 
extensive pretrial testimony was introduced over three separate 
hearings held March 12, 1988; March 18, 1988; and May 31, 1988 
(R. 213, 211, and 215). It is important to note that Officer 
This Court has repeatedly indicated that "as a general 
rule, we will not engage in state constitutional analysis unless 
an argument for different analyses under the state and federal 
constitutions is briefed." State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 
n.5 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 
1987); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-273 (Utah 1985). Since 
defendant has not argued a different analysis between the state 
and federal constitutions, this Court should address this issue 
on federal constitutional grounds only. Further, this Court has 
traditionally construed Article I, Section 14 and the Fourth 
Amendment, which textually are nearly identical, as providing the 
same scope of protection. See e.g. State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 
(Utah 1976); State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 
(1968). 
Stuck and defendant each testified during these hearings and at 
trial. The trial court, after reviewing all the evidence, 
including the demeanor of the witnesses, denied defendant's 
motion to suppress. 
Based on the testimony presented, the initial stop and 
questioning by Officer Stuck was justified, either as a brief 
voluntary police/citizen encounter, or as an investigatory stop 
supported by reasonable suspicion. 
This Court has recently cited with approval in State v. 
Dietman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987), the Fifth Circuit Court's 
delineation of the three levels of police encounters with the 
public "which the United States Supreme Court has held are 
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constitutionally permissible." Jki. at 617. These three levels 
are: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
In Dietman, officers responded to a burglar alarm which 
sounded at International Video in Salt Lake City. As the 
officers arrived they observed a truck pull away from the curb 
across the street from the video store. An officer followed the 
truck until it stopped a few blocks away. When the individuals 
exited the truck the officer asked if he could speak with them. 
The individuals voluntarily responded and presented 
identification upon request. This Court, in holding the 
investigatory stop was constitutionally valid, stated "[t]he 
officer was justified in asking defendant for identification and 
an explanation of their presence in an area where police had 
responded to a burglar alarm. Defendants were not detained 
against their will and were not arrested at this time*" Ici. at 
618. 
the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed. 
Id. at 617; see United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 228, 230 (5th 
Cir. 1984), cert, denied, Hartsel v. United States, 476 U.S. 
1142, 106 S.Ct. 2250, 90 L.Ed.2d 696 (1986). The State maintains 
that defendant's initial stop was acceptable under both levels 
(1) and (2). 
A. Police/Citizen Encounter 
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App, 1987), 
this Court addressed the issue of when, during a police 
encounter, a seizure occurs. In that case, Trujillo and others 
were walking slowly down the street, peering into windows at 3:30 
in the morning. An officer approached them and asked for 
identification. No one tried to flee and all three gave the 
officer their correct names. They explained that they were going 
to Trujillo's cousin's house. The officer frisked Trujillo and 
found a knife strapped to his chest. In determining when and if 
Trujillo had been seized, the Court stated: 
A seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment occurs only when the officer by 
means of physical force or show of authority 
has in some way restricted the liberty of a 
person. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 100 
S.Ct. at 1876 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 
n.16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, n.16). When a 
reasonable person, based on the totality of 
the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit 
of cooperation with the officer's 
investigation, but because he believes he is 
not free to leave a seizure occurs. j[d. at 
544, 555, 100 S.Ct. at 1870, 1877. 
Id. at 87 (footnote omitted). The Court found insufficient 
information in the record to determine whether a seizure occurred 
prior to the pat-down search of Trujillo so it "assume[d] that up 
to that point no intrusion upon Trujillo's protected rights 
occurred." ]ji. at 88. 
In the present case, there is conflicting testimony as 
to what occurred during the original encounter between Officer 
Stuck and defendant. Officer Stuck testified that, at the time 
of the initial stop, he drove up to where defendant was standing, 
exited his patrol car and merely inquired whether defendant had 
any identification or explanation as to why the other person ran 
(R. 212 at 156). Defendant voluntarily cooperated with Officer 
Stuck, giving his name, date of birth and his address (R. 213 at 
21). Officer Stuck specifically testified that at no time prior 
to the arrival of Officer Rackley did he give orders to, or come 
into physical contact with, defendant. Further, he did not 
attempt to move or handcuff defendant, or at any time draw his 
weapon (R. 213 at 21-22).5 
Defendant claimed that when Officer Stuck exited the 
car, "he told me to hold it, and I turned around and he had his 
hand on his gun." (R. 212 at 224). Defendant then asked what was 
going on (R. 212 at 227). Defendant claimed that Officer Stuck, 
without responding to the question, immediately handcuffed him 
and backed him up to a fence, where he remained until Officer 
Rackley arrived ten minutes later (R. 212 at 227). Defendant 
Officer Stuck, when asked if defendant was free to walk 
away during the initial encounter, testified, "I suppose if he 
had tried to walk away, I don't know if I could have been able to 
stop him or not at that point . . . I didn't require him to stay 
there. I didn't tell him he had to stay there. The subject 
never came up. I cooperated with him" (R. 213 at 12). 
also denied that Officer Stuck asked for any information 
including identification, indicating H[h]e didn't ask for 
nothing" (R. 215 at 12-13). Defendant testified that, following 
Officer Rackley's arrival, a search occurred (R. 212 at 229). 
Consequently, a determination of when and whether a 
"seizure" or even detention occurred during the initial stop, 
must necessarily be based on the credibility of the witnesses' 
testimony. We must assume that the trial court, by denying 
defendant's motion to suppress, accepted the testimony of Officer 
Stuck over the testimony of defendant. This Court has repeatedly 
indicated that determining the credibility of the witnesses is a 
function best left to the trier of fact, and the trier of fact is 
entitled to use its own judgment as to the evidence it would 
believe, without any obligation to accept as true, defendant's 
version of the evidence or his self exculpating statements as to 
his intentions and/or his conduct. See i.e., State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401 (Utah 1986); State v. Schoenfield, 545 P.2d 193 (Utah 
1976); Sullivan v. Turner, 448 P.2d 907 (Utah 1968). 
In the instant case, there are numerous reasons why the 
trial court or the jury could have reasonably excluded the 
testimony of defendant. First, defendant claimed that he neither 
knew, nor had he been walking with, the individual who had ran 
after spotting the police cruiser (R. 212 at 181, 213 at 10). 
This testimony was inconsistent with Officer Stuck's testimony 
that he had observed defendant with the other individual, walking 
Defendant claimed that he was not asked for identification 
until after Officer Rackley arrived and he was handcuffed to the 
fence (R. 215 at 15). 
side by side down the sidewalk, for at least a half a block (R. 
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212 at 153, R. 213 at 7). Second, defendant claimed that he 
had been at his "uncle" Montoya or Martinez's house, which, 
Officer Stuck testified, he later recanted when it was discovered 
to be untrue (R. 213 at 36). Third, defendant claimed that he 
had walked past the Redwood Road Pizza Hut just before he was 
stopped by Officer Stuck. Yet, he claimed, he saw nothing 
unusual going on, except that he may have heard a fight (R. 212 
at 242). Judging from the distance between where defemdant was 
stopped and the location of Pizza Hut (two to three blocks away), 
it was very likely that the police had already arrived at the 
Pizza Hut, or, at a minimum, the robbery was taking or had just 
taken place at the time defendant claims that he was walking 
through the parking lot. Fourth, defendant implied that Officer 
Stuck committed gross misconduct. Defendant not only claimed 
conduct amounting to false imprisonment at the time of the 
initial stop, but also claimed that Officer Stuck was "pissed 
off" and physically threatened him on a number of occasions (R. 
212 at 232, 234, 239). No other evidence corroborated this 
allegation by defendant, including the testimony of Officer 
Rackley, whom defendant claimed was present on at least one 
occasion when he was physically threatened (R. 212 at 236-37 and 
248-50). Fifth, defendant testified that when he was taken to 
his "uncle's" house to corroborate his story, and when he found 
Defendant also claimed the other individual was not wearing a 
shirt (R. 215 at 21), although this was also in direct 
contradiction with Officer Stuck's observation that the man was 
wearino a liaht colored flhirt (R. 212 at 17R-17Q\. 
out his "uncle" denied that defendant had been there, he 
specifically requested to talk to the "uncle" (R. 212 at 239). 
The jury may have found such a request strange, since defendant 
denied having actually met his "uncle" when he had visited the 
house, and there was no need to speak to his "uncle" to 
corroborate his story (R. 212 at 234). 
The trial court and the jury, after seeing the demeanor 
of the each witness and reviewing defendant's claims, could have 
reasonably dismissed his testimony as unreliable. Therefore, 
rejecting the allegations by defendant and accepting the 
testimony of Officer Stuck, there was no detention and no 
"seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes at the initial stop. 
Under this Court's decision in Dietman, and specifically the 
first level of acceptable constitutional conduct delineated in 
Kerritt, the stop was proper with or without reasonable suspicion 
as merely a voluntary police/citizen encounter. 
However, should this Court determine that there was a 
detention requiring reasonable suspicion, or find for some other 
reason a showing of reasonable suspicion was necessary, Officer 
Stuck articulated sufficient circumstances to warrant an 
investigatory stop. 
B. Reasonable Suspicion 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982), provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
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In accordance with § 77-7-15, this Court has held that "[t]hough 
there may be no probable cause to make an arrest, a police 
officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate 
manner, approach a person for investigating possible criminal 
behavior." State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 1980). 
Further, this Court has said: 
When a police officer sees or hears conduct 
which gives rise to suspicion of crime, he 
has not only the right but the duty to make 
observations and investigations to determine 
whether the law is being violated: and if so, 
to take such measures as are necessary in the 
enforcement of the law. 
State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 
Folkes v. Utah, 434 U.S. 971, 98 S.Ct. 523, 54 L.Ed.2d 461 
(1977). 
The United States Supreme Court in Adams v. Williams, 
407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) indicated "[a] 
brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his 
identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while 
obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of 
the facts known to the officer at the time." J^ci. at 146 
(citations omitted). The stop and questioning is an 
With regard to the foregoing argument on police/citizen 
encounters, it appears that this Court has accepted non-detention 
voluntary police encounters without reasonable suspicion in spite 
of S 77-7-15. See State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987); 
see also Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah App. 
1987). In Dietman, this Court specifically rejected the holdings 
in State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), and State v. 
Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) as inapplicable because the 
defendants in those cases were stopped, detained, and searched 
without their consent. 
"intermediate response" so that a police officer "who lacks . . . 
probable cause to arrest [need not] shrug his shoulders and allow 
a crime to occur or a criminal to escape." J^ i. at 145. See also 
State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d 269, 508 P.2d 534 (1973). Law 
enforcement officers must be able to approach a person for 
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though 
there is no probable cause to make an arrest. See United States 
/. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 
(1983); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) . 
In the present case, the initial stop by Officer Stuck 
was valid. As illustrated by the following facts, Officer Stuck 
clearly had reasonable suspicion justifying a brief investigatory 
stop. 
On August 13, 1987, shortly after 1:00 a.m., Officer 
Stuck was cruising in his patrol car with the headlights and 
radio off, searching for a runaway juvenile (R. 212 at 151-152, 
R. 213 at 9). As he drove down a side-street in a residential 
neighborhood, he observed two individuals walking southbound down 
the sidewalk, side by side, toward him. Officer Stuck continued 
to watch the individuals proceed together for approximately half 
a block (R. 212 at 153, R. 213 at 7). Suddenly, at a point where 
Officer Stuck believed the individuals recognized his police 
cruiser, one of the men took off running (R. 212 at 178-179). 
Officer Stuck then drove to where the remaining individual was 
standing, exited his patrol car and asked the individual if he 
had any identification, and an explanation as to why the other 
person ran (R. 212 at 156). Officer Stuck testified that the 
specific reason he had stopped and questioned defendant was "the 
fact that [defendant] had been with another man who ran from me, 
and at 1:00 o'clock in the morning in an area that had a very 
high incidence of nighttime residential burglary and car prowls;" 
additionally, he had "taken several car prowl reports" during 
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that week from nearby apartment buildings (R. 213 at 8-9). 
It may be that none of the above factors alone would be 
sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion; nonetheless, the 
factors when combined are sufficient. First, this Court, while 
holding that flight alone upon the presence of a law enforcement 
officer "in the abstract is not sufficient to constitute probable 
cause for arrest," it is nonetheless one factor which may be 
included in making a determination of whether probable cause for 
an arrest exists. State v. Elliot, 626 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 
1981). In People v. Johnson, 691 P.2d 751 (Colo. App. 1984), the 
court, in determining whether a law enforcement officer had 
reasonable suspicion to warrant an investigative stop, stated, 
"defendant and a confederate were running bent down like 
'football players carrying a football.' As the United States 
Supreme Court observed . . . 'deliberately furtive actions and 
flight at the approach of . . . law officers are strong indicia 
of mens rea.'" ^d. at 753/ citing Sibron v. New Yorkf 392 U.S. 
In his brief, defendant failed to indicate all the reasons set 
forth above as to why Officer Stuck made the initial stop, merely 
stating, "[o]n Officer Stuck's own admission, Mr. Ramirez had not 
done anything to arouse suspicion other than be in the 
neighborhood at one o'clock in the morning" (Brief of Appellant 
[hereinafter Br. of App.] at 15). 
40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1912, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); see also People 
v. Perez, 690 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1984). Second, this Court has 
found that the lateness of the hour and the high crime rate of a 
specific area are also important factors which can be considered 
when determining whether reasonable suspicion exists. In State 
v. Ballenberqer, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982), this Court held that 
law enforcement officers were justified in making an 
investigatory stop, knowing, 
the lateness of the hour, the suspicious 
movements of the defendant and his companion, 
and the fact that the officers had been 
advised of the high rate of burglaries in the 
area, together with the unobstructed view of 
the C.B. equipment. 
Id. at 929. 
Finally, the intrusion in this case was minimal. As 
testified by Officer Stuck at trial, defendant, at the time of 
the initial stop, was not arrested, handcuffed, moved, or treated 
in any improper manner, but merely questioned. Therefore, the 
investigatory stop was supported by sufficient reasonable 
suspicion and was not in violation of § 77-7-15 or defendant's 
constitutional rights. 
POINT II 
MR. WILSON'S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT WAS 
THE RESULT OF A CLEAR AND CONSCIENTIOUS 
OBSERVATION OF DEFENDANT, AND WAS NOT THE 
PRODUCT OF ANY IMPROPER INFLUENCE OR 
UNNECESSARY SUGGESTION. 
Defendant contends that the eyewitness testimony of 
Gerald Wilson should have been suppressed "inasmuch as that 
identification of [defendant] was the product of unconstitutional 
suggestive showup procedures'1 (Br. of App. at 18-19). 
Of the three victim/witnesses, Mr. Wilson was the only 
individual who sufficiently observed defendant at the scene of 
the robbery to later positively identify him as one of the 
robbers. Therefore, it is only the evidence which would tend to 
show whether or not Mr. Wilson's personal identification of 
defendant was the result of improper suggestiveness that is 
relevant to this issue. Defendant alleges two instances where 
the police conduct was impermissibly suggestive in violation of 
defendant's constitutional rights. First, when police were about 
to escort Mr. Wilson to identify defendant, Mr. Wilson testified 
•' [t]he police officer told me 'I've found a man that fit one of 
the descriptions. Can you come and identify him?" (R. 213 at 
50). Second, when Mr. Wilson identified defendant, he 
(defendant) was presented handcuffed behind his back and to a 
fence, and guarded by police officers. 
A brief review of the applicable law regarding 
identification, and improper "suggestiveness", shows that 
defendant's contention lacks merit. 
The United States Supreme Court set forth the modern 
rule concerning out-of-court identifications as relating to due 
process in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 
L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). In that case, a man stabbed a woman eleven 
times. The defendant was taken to a hospital where the victim 
Defendant supports his argument on this point by alleging a 
separate improper police suggestion made to another witness, Mr. 
Davis, prior to Mr. Davis' attempt to identify defendant. Any 
allegedly improper suggestion made to any other witness, which 
Mr. Wilson did not have knowledge of, is irrelevant to this 
issue. 
had undergone surgery. There, with the defendant handcuffed and 
surrounded by five police officers, an identification was made. 
The Court in upholding the conviction stated the basis on which 
due process violation claims were to be decided, "a claimed 
violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation 
depends upon the totality of circumstances surrounding it. . ." 
Id. at 302. In Stovall, the Supreme Court enunciated the steps 
to be followed in ascertaining whether or not a due process 
violation claim is valid: (1) the "totality of the 
circumstances" must be considered; (2) in viewing the 
identification procedures in light of the totality of the 
circumstances, were they "unnecessarily suggestive"; (3) if the 
procedures are found to be unnecessarily suggestive in light of 
the totality of circumstances, were they s<o unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive as to cause "irreparable mistaken" 
identification, ^d. at 302. 
Later, in Neil v. Bigqers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 
34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), the United States Supreme Court again 
addressed the subject of identification procedures. A woman had 
been raped. She had been able to view her assailant for a 
considerable amount of time, but could only give police a 
"general description" of him. She was thereafter shown several 
photographs (thirty to forty) and picked out a man as having 
features similar to those of her assailant, but positively 
identified none of the suspects. Approximately seven months 
after the commission of the crime, the victim was brought to the 
police station to view the defendant, who was being held on 
another charge. Unable to conduct a lineup due to the inability 
to locate persons who fit the defendant's unusual description, a 
showup was conducted at which time the defendant was told to 
repeat the words "shut up or I'll kill you." The defendant was 
identified as the assailant and was subsequently convicted. On 
appeal, defendant claimed that his identification and the 
circumstances surrounding it failed to comport with due process 
requirements. 
In rejecting the defendant's misidentification claim, 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rules set forth in Stovall. The 
Court also said that the unnecessary suggestions in the 
identification procedures followed in that case did not in and of 
themselves require the exclusion of evidence. Instead, the Court 
declared that the "central question" to be answered was "whether 
under the 'totality of circumstances' the identification was 
reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive." 
409 U.S. at 199. The Court then enumerated "factors to be 
considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification": 
. . . the opportunity of the witness to view 
the criminal at the time of the crime, the 
witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of 
the witness' prior description of the 
criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated 
by the witness at the confrontation, and the 
length of time between the crime and the 
confrontation . . . 
Id. at 199, 200. 
Following Biggers, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the 
five factor analysis. See State v. Newton, 657 P.2d 759 (Utah 
1983); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982); and State v. 
Wullfenstein, 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982), cert, denied Wullfenstein 
v, Utah, 460 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 1443, 75 L.Ed.2d 799 (1983). 
This Court has recently in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 491 (Utah 
1986), criticized several of the factors in the Biggers test; 
nonetheless, whether this Court examines this issue under the 
Biggers test, or under the pre-Biggers test set forth in State v. 
Perry, the identification procedure used in this case was 
entirely proper. 
This Court has stated on a number of occasions that the 
Court "will not disturb the trial court's resolution of the 
factual issues underlying its decision to grant or deny [a] 
motion to suppress absent clear error." State v. Bullock, 6S9 
P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1985), citing State v. Tuttle, 674 P.2d 125 
(Utah 1983) (while this is the citation given by the court in 
Bullock, it is clearly erroneous; it appears that the case being 
cited is found at 399 P.2d 580 (Utah 1965); and State v. Cole, 
674 P.2d 119, 122, 125 (Utah 1983). 
Reviewing the two alleged circumstances of improper 
suggestion, with the understanding that M[w]here an 
In State v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48, 492 P.2d 1349 (1972), this 
Court stated: 
the circumstances of the individual case 
should be scrutinized carefully by the trial 
court to see whether in the identification 
procedure there was anything done which 
should be regarded as so suggestive and 
persuasive that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the identification was not a 
genuine product of the knowledge and 
recollection of the witness, but was 
something so distorted or tainted that in 
fairness an accused should not be allowed to 
be tested thereby. 
identification procedure, even though suggestive, does not give 
rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification, no due 
process violation has occurred," State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 
357 (Utah 1980), reveals that each is without merit. 
First, the officer's statement to defendant, "I've 
found a man that fit one of the descriptions . • . [cjan you come 
and identify him?'", was nothing more than a simple request, 
which clearly did not improperly suggest that the suspect was 
actually involved in the robbery. Evidence at trial showed 
(contrary to any assertion by defendant) that the description 
given by Mr. Wilson prior to identifying defendant virtually 
matched the general description of defendant including his 
weight, height and clothing. Further, defendant stood by his 
description and subsequent identification, never once indicating 
that he could have been mistaken. Finally, when Mr. Wilson 
identified defendant he specifically stated "[t]hat was the man 
with the gun", although it is clear such was never "suggested" to 
the witness. (R. 213 at 51). 
Second, the reason defendant was handcuffed to the 
fence and surrounded by law enforcement officers was purely for 
security reasons (R. 212 at 204). The identification was made in 
a residential neighborhood, and the police had probable cause to 
believe that defendant had committed aggravated robbery with use 
of a deadly weapon; a deadly weapon which had not been found. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record which would 
indicate that the officer's actions were unusual or otherwise 
different from ordinary police procedure. Furthermore, Mr. 
Wilson specifically testified that at the time of the 
identification he did not know defendant was even handcuffed (R. 
212 at 94). 
Finally, defendant attempts to attack the credibility 
of Mr. Wilson's identification testimony through alleged 
discrepancies in the description given to the officers and/or his 
incapacity to adequately view the defendant at the time of the 
robbery. This Court has held on several occasions: 
The issues of the distance between the 
witness and the individual, the discrepancies 
in descriptions, and the time between the 
incident and the identification go to the 
credibility of the witness which is best 
determined by the fact finder. 
State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1983). The foregoing 
is true even where unnecessarily suggestive circumstances were 
claimed. See Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1361-1362; State v. Marsh, 682 
P.2d 1329 (Utah 1982); State v. Wullfenstein, 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 
1982); and State v. Linden, 657 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1983). There 
were no unnecessarily suggestive circumstances and, even if there 
were, they did not rise to the level sufficient to show a 
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constitutional violation of due process. 
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While the State acknowledges there may be drawbacks to 
using showups as opposed to using lineups, showups do provide a 
very important function. Showups allow an immediate 
identification following the commission of a crime, which 
improves the accuracy of the witness identification, as well 
minimizing the intrusion on members of the public. It is far 
less intrusive to temporarily detain someone for an immediate 
identification, where the individual can be freed if not 
identified, rather than taking the individual into custody and 
organizing a lineup (which may take a substantial amount of 
POINT III 
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS DURING OPENING 
STATEMENT AND CLOSING ARGUMENT WERE NOT 
IMPROPER AND DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT HIS 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. FURTHER, NO 
CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION WAS MADE DURING 
CLOSING ARGUMENT TO PRESERVE THAT ISSUE FOR 
APPEAL, 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor made four 
improper comments at trial, one during opening statement and 
three during closing argument, which prejudiced him and denied 
him a fair trial. The State separately addresses the comments 
made during closing argument from the comment made during opening 
statement. 
As defendant concedes, defense "counsel did not 
contemporaneously object to . . . [the] comments of the 
prosecutor during closing argument" (Br. of App. at 35), but 
raised this issue for the first time in a motion for new trial. 
A review of the Utah Rules of Evidence, case law, and 
the record in this case demonstrates that defendant is not 
entitled to raise this issue on appeal. Rule 103(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence makes it clear that the person complaining of 
an evidentiary ruling must make a timely objection on the record, 
stating the specific grounds for objection. While this rule does 
not specifically address closing arguments, the same general rule 
pertains to arguments. See State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 561 
(Utah 1987). 
This Court has long held that a timely objection must 
be interposed when improper statements are made. In State v. 
White, 577 P.2d 552 (Utah 1978), this Court stated: 
If counsel desires to object and preserve his 
record as to such an error during argument, 
he must call it to the attention of the trial 
court so that if he thinks that it is 
necessary and appropriate to do so, he will 
have an opportunity to rectify any error or 
impropriety therein and thus obviate the 
necessity of an entire new trial. 
Id. at 555. Recently this Court reiterated this requirement in 
Tillman when it stated: 
Indeed, it is the rule that if improper 
statements are made by counsel during a trial 
it is the duty of opposing counsel to 
register a contemporaneous objection thereto 
so that the court may make a correction by 
proper instruction and if the offense is 
sufficiently prejudicial, declare a mistrial. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 561. 
Because defendant failed to object to the alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct, this Court can only address the issue 
if it finds "plain error" under Rule 103. This Court addressed 
that option in State v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676 (Utah 1982). The 
defendant in that case had been required to try on shoes which 
had been left at a burglary scene. Her counsel had not objected 
but the issue was appealed. This Court stated: 
Under the particular circumstances of this 
case, it appears that defendant had waived 
any constitutional objections. Not having 
objected to the demonstration at the trial 
court level, she is precluded from doing so 
for the first time on appeal. 
Furthermore, the facts are not such that 
great and manifest injustice would be done if 
this Court does not entertain the issues sua 
sponte as an exception. This can be done in 
rare cases under Rule 4 (now Rule 103[d]) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, or under such 
exceptions as this Court considers of 
momentous concern in protecting 
constitutional rights previously waived. 
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 
(1970); State v. Cabo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 
952 (1936). 
Id. at 677. 
In order for the Court to address an issue of this type 
on appeal, it looks to the egregiousness of the alleged 
misconduct and whether there would be a "great and manifest 
injustice" done if the Court did not address the issue. See State 
v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988). The conduct complained of in 
the present case, as set forth below, does not rise to a level 
requiring this Court to depart from the established rule of 
requiring objections at trial. The conduct was neither improper 
nor did it influence the jury to defendant's detriment. 
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated the limited 
circumstances where improper remarks by counsel may be grounds 
for reversal. The Court in State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 
P.2d 422 (Utah 1973) indicated: 
The test of whether the remarks made by 
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case is, [1] did the 
remark call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not have been 
justified in considering in determining there 
verdict, and [2] where they under the 
circumstances of the particular case probably 
influenced by those remarks. 
Id. at 426. See also State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984); and West Valley City v. 
Rislow, 736 P.2d 637 (Utah App. 1987). 
In the instant case, the comments during the 
prosecutor's opening statement and closing argument neither 
Mcall[ed] to the attention of the jurors matters which they would 
not be justified in considering" nor did any comment improperly 
A. Closing Argument 
The following two comments, defendant contends, 
"purposefully incited the jury to react to the high crime rate 
experienced in this and other communities across the nation, 
urging them to react emotionally in responding to their duties as 
jurors" (Br. of App. at 35): 
Wouldn't it be nice if on all Pizza Huts 
and all other institutions there would be a 
camera mounted out there in a parking lot 
that could view everything; and then we could 
come to court and we could play back that 
camera video and see what happened . . . 
Perhaps you would see, as Livio Ramirez 
held that gun directly at Gerry Wilson, ten 
feet away for about one minute and then maybe 
we could begin to appreciate and we could 
begin to understand and we could begin to 
realize, the reality of the crime. What it 
meant to be a victim of a violent crime. 
Maybe we could begin to appreciate the 
fright, the pain and loss, and the 
humiliation that went along with being a 
victim of a crime. But of course, we don't 
have cameras like that. But you know that 
doesn't stop us from apprehending and 
prosecuting people who commit such crimes. 
Just doesn't stop us. All across America 
today there are juries just like this with 
juror just like you, who have to make 
decisions, not based upon cameras, but based 
upon the testimony of witnesses, people who 
are actually there, people who saw it with 
their own eyes, people who experienced it and 
who come in under oath and testify as to what 
happened. 
I think here, we even got from the 
testimony, a little bit of appreciation of 
what went on; a little bit of appreciation of 
what it feels like when you're a victim of 
the crime. Remember when Kathy Davis 
testified and talked about what went on? 
Remember those tears that came to her eye as 
she was reliving the fright, and the danger 
and the pain and the violation of her safety? 
(R. 216 at 4-6) 
The judge told you that how we choose 
juries is kind of an awkward situation. 
Mainly, you're not chosen, but you're kind of 
what's left over. Hate to tell you that, but 
that's what you are. I think we got some 
good people. If I had the chance to just go 
out and pick the jury, I want you and you. I 
tell you what I would look for. I would 
really look for people who live in my 
community and who are concerned about what 
goes on; concerned about the court system and 
would like to be involved. I hope you are 
those kind of people, because you know, I can 
come here the judge can come here the defense 
attorney could come here, and all the 
witnesses could come and do our job. But in 
the final sentence what you do, determines 
the success of this particular case. 
(R. 236 at 19-20). 
These comments were not improper, much less 
prejudicial. The prosecutor in these statements merely commented 
on what evidence had already been brought forth during trial, and 
merely commented upon the jury's important role as trier of fact 
to see that the legal system operates properly. The prosecutor's 
comment on the evidence may have highlighted the emotional impact 
the crime had upon the victims but under, the circumstances, the 
comment was proper. One of the elements the State was required 
to prove for Aggravated Robbery is the taking of personal 
property "accomplished by means of force or fear". See Utah 
Code Ann. S§ 76-6-301 and 76-6-302 (1982). The purpose of 
evidencing the impact of the crime at trial, and subsequently 
commenting on that impact during closing argument, was to prove 
and properly comment on an essential element of the crime 
charged. The comment was not improper and the defendant was not 
prejudiced. The trial court properly recognized in denying 
defendant's motion for new trial, Mthe cumulative effect of all 
the claimed irregularities in the argument by the prosecutor were 
not such that any jury would have been mislead [sic] nor inflamed 
in such manner that a miscarriage of justice occurred herein" (R. 
at 173). 
In the remaining comment made during closing argument 
which defendant contends was improper, the prosecutor commented 
briefly on the burden of proof, stating: 
A reasonable doubt must be a real 
substantial doubt and not one that's merely 
possible or imaginary. 
From that, I want to say two things. First 
of all the burden of proof is not beyond any 
doubt. If it was beyond any doubt, we 
couldn't ever prove anything could we. Just 
beyond a reasonable doubt. And as you read 
the last sentence, before you as a Jury could 
come back with a not guilty verdict, you 
would have to find a reasonable doubt, based 
upon the evidence or lack thereof and not 
just a doubt that's possible or imaginary. 
(R. 216 at 3). Defendant concedes that this is not a 
misstatement of the law. Although the statement is less than 
clear, it does not "realistically shift the burden from the State 
. . . to the defendant", as defendant claims. In addition, as 
the trial court noted in its denial for new trial, "[t]he 
definition of reasonable doubt was read to the jury by the Court 
during the course of the trial at least two times . . . [i]n [] 
addition the standard reasonable doubt instruction was given to 
the jury in written form which the jury had in the jury room" (R. 
at 173)* Furthermore, the jury was specifically instructed on 
Jury Instruction 7 provided: 
I have told you that the burden is upon the 
State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Now, by reasonable doubt 
at least two occasions that comments by counsel were not 
evidence. Accordingly, the prosecutor's comments were not only 
proper, but any confusion they may have generated was not 
prejudicial in light of the proper instruction to the jury. 
B. Opening Statement 
Defendant's final contention concerns what appears to 
be the following comment (defendant does not cite to any specific 
comment) made by the prosecutor during opening statement: 
Mr. Ramirez was arrested, and consequently 
they asked him about where he had been. He 
gave an address and claimed an uncle of his, 
he had been to and went over to the place, to 
this uncle, and inquired as to whether or not 
Mr. Ramirez had been there, and the uncle 
said no, he hadn't been there. 
Then Mr. Ramirez changed his story and said 
no, I've been out preparing for jogging. I 
need to get in shape so I was out walking 
around that evening. 
(R. 212 at 18-19). Defendant objected to this comment, in an off 
the record discussion (R. 212 at 19), contending that what the 
"uncle" said had earlier been determined to be hearsay. 
Defendant also moved for a mistrial, which motion was also 
renewed later in trial. The trial court, in denying defendant's 
motion, stated, 
Cont. is meant a doubt that it based on 
reason and one which is reasonable in view of 
all the evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies 
the mind and convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously 
upon it. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which 
reasonable men and women would entertain, and 
it must arise from the evidence in this case. 
(R. at 135). See also Jury Instructions 3 and 15 (R. at 132, 
143-146). 
while I agree that it was unfortunate and 
probably improper to put into articulated 
words, the language supposedly attributable 
to the alleged uncle in the opening 
statement; nevertheless, I don't believe that 
it created reversible error, not do I think 
it was prejudicial or by reason of fact that 
the Court had previously instructed rather 
lengthily the jury, that the statements of 
counsel are not evidence but simply 
statements of counsel. 
(R. 212 at 215). 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 
49 (Utah 1981), stated: 
[T]he [trial] court has broad discretion in 
determining whether a mistrial should be 
declared, and a denial of a motion for 
mistrial does not constitute an abuse of 
discretion where no prejudice to the accused 
is shown. The matter is not dissimilar to 
that of granting or refusing to grant a new 
trial. Such lies within the sound discretion 
of the trial judge and this Court will not 
reverse his decision thereon in the absence 
of an abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 53 (footnotes omitted). 
The denial of mistrial due to the prosecutor's comment, 
was entirely proper, as the comment clearly failed to meet either 
of the two requirements set forth in Valdez, 513 P.2d 422. 
Furthermore, the prosecutor's comment was supported by evidence 
which was eventually brought out at trial by both Officer Stuck 
and by the defendant himself (R. 212 at 71, 248-49 ) . 1 4 The Court 
allowed the following examination of Officer Stuck: 
14 
It appears under Rule 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence that 
the only part of the prosecutor's comments which could have been 
considered hearsay was when he indicated the uncle said "no". 
Since this statement was not "offered to prove the matter 
asserted", but was used only to show defendant had changed his 
story, it was not hearsay. 
Q (By Mr. Stott) Officer Stuck, I 
believe we were at a point where you had 
taken the defendant to an address that had 
pointed out to you; it that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And you had gone and talked with 
somebody at that address, is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And then you came back and talked 
with the defendant, is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q What did you tell him at that time? 
A I told the defendant his story did 
not pan out. 
(R. 212 at 71). The following discussion later took place on 
cross-examination of defendant: 
Q Then you took the officer to where 
your uncle was, is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And Uncle Joe Ortega? 
A Yes. 
Q And then went in, came back out, and 
what did they tell you when they came back 
out—Officer Stuck? 
A He told me that, "I pissed him off, 
and that I did it now." And said, "That you 
don't want me to piss you off", or "You don't 
want to piss me off." And just kept on 
threatening me. 
Q And you said on direct examination 
that Officer Stuck said that your uncle said 
you hadn't been there? 
A Yes. 
Q And what did Officer Stuck say? 
A Uh—he kept calling me a liar. 
Q Did he say anything else about what 
you uncle had said? 
A Says that I haven't been for a couple 
of days. 
Q Said that your uncle said you hadn't 
been there for a couple of days? 
A That he hadn't seen me. 
(R. 212 at 248-249). 
Even if it is determined that the prosecutor "call[ed] 
to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be 
justified in determining their verdict" (i.e. hearsay), the 
subsequent valid trial testimony by Officer Stuck and defendant 
mitigated any prejudicial effect that the comment may have had, 
whereby the jury was not improperly influenced. See Rule 30, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30 
(1982) ("any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does 
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded"). 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT DEFENDANT 
OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient 
to convict him of Aggravated Robbery. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated the 
standard of review on appeal when the argument concerns 
sufficiency of the evidence. The Court accords great deference 
to the jury verdict. It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the 
witnesses. "[T]he 'Court should only interfere when . . . 
reasonable men could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'" State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 
App. 1987), quoting State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980); 
Furthermore, defendant has the burden of establishing "'that the 
evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime.'" State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 
1985), quoting State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980); 
see also State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981). 
All of the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn 
from the evidence should be reviewed in a light most favorable to 
the jury verdict. When the evidence is so viewed, the Court 
reverses only when the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt concerning defendant's guilt. See State v. One 
1982 Silver Honda Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392, 393 (Utah App. 1987), 
citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985); see also State 
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983)/ superseded in the context of 
bench trials by statute or rule, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1987). The Court has succinctly stated that, unless there 
is a clear showing of a lack of evidence, the jury verdict will 
be upheld. See Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 412; see also State v. 
Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 814 (Utah 1977). 
The statutory requirements of Robbery and Aggravated 
Robbery, as provided by Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-301 and 76-6-302 
Robbery.--(1) Robbery is the unlawful and 
intentional taking of personal property in 
the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear. 
Aggravated robbery.—(1) A person commits 
aggravated robbery if in the course of 
committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife, or 
a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
Defendant's lone contention is that the evidence was 
insufficient "as to the identification of the perpetrators" of 
the Aggravated Robbery. In alleging that the evidence was 
insufficient, defendant attempts to discredit the eyewitness 
testimony of Mr. Wilson (and eyewitnesses in general) as 
inherently unreliable. As indicated in Point II, the credibility 
of the witness, and specifically a witness' ability to perceive 
and identify, are factual questions necessarily determined by the 
trier of fact. In the present case, the jury was correctly 
instructed as to how to judge and weigh eyewitness testimony (R. 
at 143-46, 136, and 140). 
The evidence in this case was clearly sufficient to 
identify defendant as one of the robbers. Mr. Wilson, as a 
victim and eyewitness, personally identified defendant shortly 
after the robbery and again at trial as the robber holding the 
gun (R. 212 at 91, 94). Although defendant claims this 
identification was the result of improper "suggestion", such 
claim is without merit as set out in Point II. Further, the 
description given to police by Mr* Wilson prior to the showup 
virtually matched defendant, including his height, weight and 
clothing. Along with the eyewitness identification by Mr. 
Wilson, there was substantial other evidence connecting defendant 
with the robbery: (1) All three witness/victims identified the 
clothing worn by defendant as similar to or the same as the 
clothing worn by one of the robbers during the robbery (R. 212 at 
37, 66, 94-95); (2) Mr. Davis' description of the gun robber 
virtually matched the description of defendant (R. 212 at 195, R. 
215 at 4-6); (3) Defendant was stopped minutes after the robbery 
only two to three blocks away from the scene of the robbery and 
only a block or so from where the deposit bag was discovered (R. 
212 at 140-150, R. 211 at 8). Defendant also claimed that he had 
just walked past the Pizza Hut but had not noticed any police 
cars or anything unusual, other than possibly a fight (R. 212 at 
242); and (4) defendant, when he was initially stopped, lied to 
the police as to where he had been, and whether he had been with 
the other man who had fled. He also subsequently changed his 
story as to where he had been when his first story was found to 
be false (R. 213 at 11, 36). The evidence was sufficient to 
sustain the conviction of defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the jury's verdict of conviction 
in this case. 
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